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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2013.07.013s y n o p s i sAvailable online 2 September 2013 This article reviews the debate on ‘intersectionality’ as the dominant approach in gender studies,
with an emphasis on the politics of representation. The debate on intersectionality officially
began in the late 1980s, though the approach can be traced back to the institutionalization of
women's studies in the 1970s and the feminist movement of the 1960s. Black and lesbian
feminists have long advocated hyphenated identities to be the backbone of feminist thought.
But in recent years, intersectionality has sustained criticism from numerous angles within gender
studies, ranging from feminist philosophy to applied political research. This article will use
the theorization of ‘interference’ as a searchlight to produce an overview of this interdisciplinary
debate, culminating in our affirmative answer to the question: should we move from inter-
sectionality to interference? Our answer is based on onto-epistemological reflections, i.e., reflections
in which being and knowing are always already entangled.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction: intersectionality under fire
‘Intersectionality’ – or the idea that subjects are situated
in frameworks of multiple, interacting forms of oppression
and privilege through socially constructed categories such as
gender and ‘race’/ethnicity – has become a central paradigm
in feminist theory (see e.g., Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013;
Franken, Woodward, Cabó, & Bagilhole, 2009; Lutz, Theresa
Herrera Vivar, & Supik, 2011; Oleksy, 2011). It is seen as
“the most important theoretical contribution that women's
studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so
far” (McCall, 2005: 1771) and a prescient tool to further
the inclusive political project of feminism (Wekker, 2004).
Nevertheless, intersectionality's success appears to have much
to do with its “vagueness and open-endedness” (Davis, 2008:pecial issue ofWomen's
ation and constructive,
k the two anonymous
ents, and Takeo David
recht, the Netherlands.
ll rights reserved.69). We begin with its terminology. While most authors
have used the metaphor of an intersection or crossroad to
think about the inter-relatedness of social categories and their
multi-facetted impact on the subject (see e.g., Crenshaw, 1989,
1991; Wekker, 2002), others have preferred to work with a
matrix of domination (Collins, 1990/2009; Harding, 1995), the
notion of transversal politics (Collins, 1990/2009; Yuval-Davis,
1999), and reconceptualizations of intersectionality as either a
performative process (Staunæs, 2003) or a Deleuzian rhizome
with crisscrossing roots that depict the multi-directionality of
oppression (Lykke, 2011). The latter are all attempts to change
the very basis of intersectionality – its conceptual attachment
to social constructivism – which has been critiqued for two,
seemingly opposite, reasons. This article will explain these
critiques and continue this critical line of reasoning through
a so-called ‘onto-epistemological’ analysis of the politics of
representation (Barad et al., 2007).
Naomi Zack's philosophical critique of intersectional
thought searches for a non-exclusive commonality between
women owing to intersectionality's “ontological indetermi-
nacy” (Zack, 2007: 199). Since an intersectional model could
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ceaselessly intersecting categories, a philosophical defense
of the latter would have to be based upon moral rather than
theoretical grounds. Theoretically, intersectionality's politics
of representation leads to relativism. On the other end of
the spectrum, scholars from critical race studies and feminist
post-humanism have criticized intersectionality for being
exclusivist. By portraying black women as the “quintessential
intersectional subjects” (Nash, 2008: 1), and by leaving the
experiences of (partially and fully) privilegedwomenout of the
picture, black women are once again represented monolithi-
cally. The critique of exclusivity has also been developed on a
more ontological level. Maneesha Deckha (2008), for instance,
has argued that the intersectional paradigm is rooted in anthro-
pomorphic assumptions which have prevented scholars from
considering the differences between human and non-human
species. The exclusivism of intersectionality stems from its
epistemic bias: intersectional thinkers have accentuated
the epistemological aspects of social categories (i.e., how is
race known?) to such an extent that they have neglected
the ontological and material, bodily aspects of, for instance,
racialized subjects (Saldanha, 2006: 9). Counter-intuitively,
ontological reflections broaden intersectionality's theo-
retical reach, whereas the foregoing epistemic bias is caused
by feminism's anxiety about the body in particular, stemming
from the naturalization of women and minorities. Indeed,
intersectional theories arose in the intellectual climate of
feminist poststructuralism and postmodernism – schools of
thought that focused on social constructivism and discursivity
and which are currently being criticized for their anti-
materialist attitudes. The latter set of reflections can be called
onto-epistemological.
While some scholars criticize intersectionality for being
too rooted in modern nature/culture and human/non-human
binaries, others engage in critical and affirmative dialogues
with intersectional thought within their own disciplines
(see also Mügge & de Jong, 2013). One such scholar is political
scientist Mieke Verloo, who argues that the European Union
currently lacks policies that take multiple and diverse inequal-
ities into account. In response she has developed her own
Crenshaw-inspired model of political intersectionality, political
mainstreaming. Verloo has a dynamic understanding of in-
equalities, and like the critics referred to above, does not
neglect the influence that power structures have on subjects
and social categories (see Verloo, 2006: 224). In doing so
she introduces the concept of interference, which refers to
“the convergence of waves (light/sound/water), which results
in patterns of intensification or higher intensity, while there are
also places where thewaves cancel each other or are weakened”
(Verloo, 2009: 10; our translation). Intersectionality, then,
should be limited to those interference patterns that “lead to an
increase or specification of inequality” (Verloo, 2009: 10). Verloo
argues that though structural inequalities exist, we cannot
assume to know their inner workings and precise effects. Not
only does intersectionality take oppression to the nth power
for granted (i.e., it quantifies power relations along the lines
of second-wave feminism's double oppression); it has too many
presuppositions about the ontology of power (it is a pure
potestas or restriction, whereas Michel Foucault also pointed to
the potential, or the productive side of power (Braidotti, 1994/
2011)). Verloo wants to be able to show that a particular policycan have a negative impact on those whom we deem
universally powerful (white, heterosexual, middle-class, able-
bodied women).
This article follows Verloo by asking whether we
should move from the paradigm of intersectionality in
contemporary gender studies to the realm of interference.
Inspired by the so-called ‘feminist new materialist’ cri-
tique of social constructivism, which allows us to focus on
the ontological dimension of intersectional research, we
first present a genealogy of intersectional thought and its
epistemological premises (see also Carbin& Edenheim, 2013).
We then reflect on how intersectionality's identity politics (or
its politics of representation) is related to representationalism
(i.e., the epistemological backbone of essentialism and con-
structivism alike). This enables us to evaluate the promises of
interference, for which we turn to feminist new materialist
Karen Barad, the feminist philosopher–physicist who has
proposed a comprehensive theory of interference or ‘diffrac-
tion’ (Barad et al., 2007). In otherwords, onto-epistemology and
interference are intricately linked; they stem from the same
paradigm.
The genealogy of intersectionality
Although the debate on intersectionality officially took
off in the late 1980s, black and lesbian feminists have long
tried to open up the category of women through hyphenated
identities. This, however, does not mean that intersectionality
theorists in the 1980s and 1990s simply recycled the ideas
of black feminist groups, as Jennifer Nash has claimed (Nash,
2008, 9). Although we wish to refrain from reading the inter-
sectionality debate teleologically, a genealogical overview
shows that intersectional theories have their origins in black
feminist thought, where they were developed as critiques
of the exclusivity and solipsism of feminist theories that solely
focused on the experiences of white, middleclass women
(Crenshaw, 1989; hooks, 1984). After this initial critical phase,
intersectionality since the early 1990s has steadily becomepart
of the feminist canon.
In this part of our essay, we show that intersectional
theory has integrated much of the epistemological content of
feminist standpoint theory, which is why it has been so
easily mainstreamed within the feminist theoretical landscape.
Intersectionality's epistemological premises can be best demon-
strated by first looking at Sandra Harding's famous classification
of feminist epistemologies in (Harding, 1986).
Intersectional theory and the feminist standpoint: Harding and
black feminist thought
In Science Question, Harding claims that there are three
possible feminist answers to what should be seen as knowl-
edge and on what kinds of experience knowledge should be
based: namely feminist empiricism, the feminist standpoint,
and feminist postmodernism. Empiricism sees scientific facts as
neutrally mirroring reality outside the academy; its ground
structure hints at positivism (i.e., only trusting verification by
sense data). But feminist empiricism also argues that women/
feminists as a group produce more objective knowledge than
men/non-feminists as individuals or as a group, and that
social liberation movements increase the level of objectivity by
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feminist standpoint theories therefore argue that “commu-
nities [of people] and not primarily individuals produce
knowledge” (Harding, 1993: 65). Nevertheless, feminist
empiricism mainly problematized bad science (Harding,
1986: 24–5). Feminist standpoint theory was the revolu-
tionary branch of feminist epistemology with its “stronger
standards for maximizing objectivity” (Harding, 1993: 69)
— its call for strong reflexivity placed “the subject of
knowledge […] on the same critical, causal plane as the
objects of knowledge” (Harding, 1986: 69). Feminist
standpoint theory thus problematizes science-as-usual
and invents a science by and for women.
Science Question then presented feminist postmodernism
as the advocate of basing feminist knowledge claims on the
fractured identities of “a Black-feminist, a socialist–feminist,
a lesbian–feminist, and so forth” (Harding, 1986: 193).
Feminist postmodernism works differently from feminist
standpoint theory as “the goal of telling ‘one true story’” is
abandoned in favor of “the permanent partiality of feminist
inquiry” (Harding, 1986: 194). The problematic universalisms
of feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory were
said to be resolved in feminist postmodernism's focus on
diversity rather than equality or difference. Following Donna
Haraway's (1988) famous critique that the universalisms of
feminist empiricism and the feminist standpoint, on the
one hand, and the potential relativism of feminist post-
modernism, on the other, were unreal binaries, Harding
(1993: 66) stuck to the fact that “lesbian, poor, and racially
marginalized women are all women.” Seemingly uncon-
cerned by the naturalizing effects of universalism, Harding
allowed feminist standpoint to incorporate feminist
postmodernism's concerns.
Some of the key points of feminist standpoint theory – that
social relationships are power-laden and often conflictual, and
that social disadvantage translates into epistemological advan-
tage (see Harding, 1986: 26, 1993: 53–56, 1995: 341–344) –
were already central to intersectionality's forerunners, includ-
ing the Black liberationist Combahee River Collective. The
latter focused on the “personal experiences of individual Black
women's lives” (Combahee River Collective, 1977/1982: 221)
and anticipated intersectionality's emphasis on how different
forms of oppressions are experienced simultaneously. Feminist
intersectionality theorists such as Kimberlé Crenshaw, bell
hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, and Audre Lorde then continued
this line of thought in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
Their inscription in feminist standpoint theory allowed
intersectionality to make its first inroads into academic
feminism.
Crenshaw is said to have coined the term intersectionality.
Her landmark essay “Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex” (Crenshaw, 1989) analyzes some paradigmatic
American court cases on the discrimination of Black women.
Crenshaw attacks traditional feminist theory and antiracist
policy discourses for being epistemologically flawed: instead
of focusing on the totality of “Black women's experience”
(Combahee River Collective, 1977/1982: 139), these theo-
retical models fragmented Black female subjectivity by
focusing either on gender oppression or on blackness. The
idea of Black women being discriminated against twice, and
simultaneously, remains unnoticed in theories that workwithin a single-axis framework. As Crenshaw interpreted
this ‘either-or’ approach:
Black women are regarded either as too much like women
or Blacks and the compounded nature of their experience
is absorbed into the collective experiences of either group
or as too different, in which case Black women's Blackness
or femaleness sometimes has placed their needs and
perspectives at the margins of the feminist and Black
liberationist agendas (Crenshaw, 1989: 150).
Here we face a situation of either universalism (a common
humanity) or marginalization (essential racial/sexual differ-
ence). For Crenshaw, feminist universalist theories are unable
to identify female blackness, while universalist theories of race
are unable to specify Black femaleness. Put differently, female
Blackness is subsumed under sex and Black femaleness under
‘race.’ Either way, the effect for Crenshaw is the same: “Black
women [have been treated] in ways that deny both the unique
compoundedness of their situation and the centrality of
their experiences to the larger classes of women and Blacks”
(Crenshaw, 1989: 150). Black female subjects thus remain
under-represented, even unrepresented. Crenshaw hopes
to correct this epistemological wrongdoing through her
intersectional approach, which resists fragmenting Black
women into either sexualized or racialized subjects: “the
intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism
and sexism” (Crenshaw, 1989: 140). Crenshaw later continued
her project by conceptualizing intersectionality as a structural,
political, representational, and hence multi-layered phenome-
non (Crenshaw, 1991).
Crenshaw as well as hooks, Lorde and especially Collins
placed Black women's “lived experience” (Collins, 1990/2009:
275–279; hooks, 1984: 15) at the center of analysis. It is their
“subjugated knowledge” (Collins, 1990/2009: 269) that allows
Black women to see through, for example, events in court.
The above thinkers have thus not only followed in Black
feminism's footsteps, but also developed the core of feminist
standpoint theory that basically begins with the motto ‘the
personal is political’ and focuses on the feminist–Marxist
model of dialectical knowledge production. They also plead
for approaching and representing Black female subjects in a
holistic, i.e., non-fragmented (see for instance Lorde et al.,
1997: 378) andnon-additivemanner (see also Spelman, 1988)
— a typical feature of feminist standpoint theory as it tries to
move away from the standard liberal atomist philosophy that a
subject equals the sum of her/his atom-like aspects of identity.
Intersectional theorists such as Collins respect the multi-
tude of experiences and the “different patterns of experiential
knowledge” (Collins, 1990/2009: 30) of Black women. This
anti-essentialist stance leads to a straightforward rejection of
identity politics as it “conflates or ignores intragroup differ-
ences” (Crenshaw, 1991: 1242). Unlike traditional liberatory
politics or antiracist discourses, intersectional theory starts
from the idea that there are “multiple dimensions of identity”
(Crenshaw, 1991: 1245) to be considered when dealing with
Blackwomen's experiences. It is this focus on a non-essentialist
group politics, or what Collins has labeled transversal politics
(Collins, 1990/2009: 264–268) – i.e., a dialogical, anti-binary
kind of group politics that sees the group as a fluid entity,
composed of subjects that have certain (but not all) categories
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to feminist postmodern theories from the early 1990s that
radicalized standpoint theoretical attempts to embrace anti-
essentialism and anti-universalism. While the analysis of
‘difference’ became the focal point of feminist theoretical
landscapes in the 1990s (see Felski, 1997), the similarities
between feminist postmodernism and intersectional theories
are of further interest to us because they can shed light on
why intersectional theory and the idea of multiple differences
were so enthusiastically incorporated into contemporary
feminist theory. It is intersectionality's versatility – shown by
its incorporation into feminist standpoint theory and its later
adaptation by feminist postmodernism – that has made this
theory so long-lived.
Intersectional theory and feminist postmodernism: Butler as a
turning point
The earlier works of feminist and queer philosopher
Judith Butler are epitomes of feminist postmodernist
thought. Butler (2006) is best known for its deconstruction
of the feminist sex/gender distinction and its radical social
constructivist ideas about gender as something that now
“proves to be performative — that is, constituting the
identity it is purported to be” (Butler, 1990/2006: 33).
Butler's theory of gender performativity and subversion is
based on the postmodern and Foucauldian deconstruction of
the Cartesian cogito: the days of the modern rational subject,
according to Butler, are gone. There is no longer a “doer behind
the deed” (Butler, 1990/2006: 181); instead, “the ‘doer’ is
variably constructed in and through the deed” (Butler, 1990/
2006: 181). This antifoundationalism is also mirrored in
Butler's conceptualization of identity: if the doer, apart from
her/his actions, is no longer there, then what are we to dowith
the category of ‘Woman’ that has important feminist–political
meanings as well? Seen from Butler's antifoundationalist point
of view, there is no stable (female) subject position; the
feminist assumption that women have a “common identity”
(Butler, 1990/2006: 4) is built on the Enlightenment fictions of
essentialism and universalism. This complicates the traditional
model of feminist identity politics (which rests upon a logic
of representationalism, or the idea that there are two different
and separate kinds of ontological entities, namely objects
and their representations, as we will see later). Butler's com-
plicating move is not only supported by her philosophical anti-
foundationalism, but by her own take on intersectional theory.
Butler in Gender Trouble already hints at the intersections
of gender, ‘race’/ethnicity, class, and sexuality, and criticizes
the additive approach to these social categories. But her
incorporation of intersectional theory only becomes fully
manifest in Butler (1993), where she states that she does not
want to do away with the categories of gender, ‘race,’ and
others altogether: she may be an antifoundationalist, but is no
supporter of what Crenshaw dubbed “the vulgarized social
construction thesis” (Crenshaw, 1991: 1296), i.e., the idea that
nothing exists outside of its social constructedness. After all,
the entire project of Bodies That Matter was to study “[w]hich
bodies come to matter— and why?” (Butler, 1993: xii). Maybe
more than in Gender Trouble, Butler in Bodies That Matter
clarifies that although she believes our identities are socially,
discursively, and performatively constructed, these identitiesand social categories do exist, namely in their corporeal
materialization and as the effects of “oppressive regimes of
power” (Butler, 1993: 123). Although intersectional theorists
may criticize Butler for over-investing in the subversion of
power regimes by queering their norms, her approach approx-
imates a typical intersectional one; they would applaud
Butler's thesis that neither sexual difference nor ‘race’ or
any other social category trumps others in the constitution
of the subject, and in the analysis of how this subject is
oppressed (Butler, 1993: 130).
It would be too much to claim that Butler was solely
responsible for mainstreaming intersectionality, though she
did focus on the intersections of sex, gender, and sexuality
in Gender Trouble, and their intersections with ‘race’ in Bodies
ThatMatter. The popular reception of these books in the feminist
theoretical canon hasmade the subject of intersectionalitymore
accepted. The irony is that although intersectionality has grown
into a popular theoretical and multidisciplinary approach in
feminist theory, the paradigm itself is now under attack for
falling back into the same kind of representationalist logic that
was central to identity politics. This is one of intersectionality's
most complex and problematic epistemological deficiencies, as
we will show next.
Intersectionality's own blind spot: representationalism
Although feminist postmodernists and intersectional
theorists are equally suspicious of the political viability of
identity politics – a model that, in the end, rests upon a false
universalism – feminist postmodern and poststructuralist
thinkers such as Butler have also criticized its epistemology.
Whereas Butler argues that the representationalist logic
behind identity politics ceased making sense after Foucault
showed us that subjects are in fact produced by those discourses
and apparatuses of power that represent them,1 intersectional
theory – before Butler – still appears to be fully embedded
in this logic. Intersectional thinkers namely tend to treat
subjects such as Black women as being restricted by the
hegemonic discourse, though they themselves claim to be
able to see through it. Intriguingly, the defective logic that
assumes that the (Black) scholar is positioned outside of the
discourse is now also being ascribed to Butler by feminist
new materialists. In the words of Claire Colebrook:
On the one hand, […] Butler appears to be anti-postmodern,
for she rejects the idea of a system of signs imposed
on an otherwise neutral and inaccessible sex. On the
other hand, she represents the epitome of equivocal
logics. Our position within a system of norms produces
a radical difference between norm and that which
the norm supposedly orders, organizes and represents
(Colebrook, 2004: 293).
What is truly problematic is that such a representationalist
or ‘equivocal’ feminist theory, even according to Butler, runs
the risk of being self-defeating:
The suggestion that feminism can seek wider represen-
tation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic
consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing
to take account of the constitutive powers of their own
representational claims (Butler, 1990/2006: 6).
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break through ‘single-axis’ or ‘either-or’ approaches in court as
well as in feminist and anti-racist research practices remains
epistemologically valuable. After all, feminist philosophy is
based on the insight that substance dualism, or the claim
that dichotomous pairs are inherently gendered, is key to
the naturalization of women (de Beauvoir, 1949/2010; Lloyd,
1983/1994), just like anti-racist philosophy is based on the
insight that substance dualism has naturalized and muted
non-white subjects (Zack, 2002). Substance dualism is pred-
icated on subject–object differentiation and hierarchy; it lures
us into a situation in which “to be different-from means to be
worth-less-than” (Braidotti, 1994/2011: 20). But intersectional
theory itself turns out to be a form of representationalism
(see also Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2013), especially when
the latter is formulated as “the belief in the ontological
distinction between representations and that which they
purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented
is held to be independent of all practices of representing”
(Barad, 2003: 804). Barad shows how this dualism structuring
intersectional theory – representations being active and the
represented mute; epistemology preceding and governing
ontology – prevents ontological reflection. What Butler shares
with intersectional theorists and feminists supporting differ-
ent identity politics is exactly this dualism or ‘equivocal logic.’
Seeing through the alleged radicality of liberation move-
ments and their epistemic twists and attempting to shift
instead of reproduce power relations is not new, neither in the
context of Black theory nor in the gender theory. Anthony
Appiah for instance argued for such shifting in the context of
black thought. After reviewing the work of W.E.B. Du Bois in
“The Uncompleted Argument,” Appiah writes:
In his early work, Du Bois took race for granted and sought
to revalue one pole of the opposition of white to black. The
received concept is a hierarchy, a vertical structure, and Du
Bois wished to rotate the axis, to give race a ‘horizontal’
reading. Challenge the assumption that there can be an axis,
however oriented in the space of values, and the project
fails for loss of presuppositions (Appiah, 1985/1986: 36).2
The argument here is that the geometry (an ‘axiometry’)
implied in black thought makes it impossible to break out
of the chains of dualist structures. First, there is dualism within
the realm of representations. The Self/Other dichotomy should
not be turned on its axis as this results in standpoint theories
re-affirming existing power relations. Second, and simulta-
neously, dualism is ever-present in representationalism's
internal structure in which thought holds priority over being.
In the manner of Appiah, gender scholars like Colebrook have
argued against a reversal within the equivocal logic (according
to which women would be upgraded to the level and realm
of men) and for the alternative logic of univocity. Following
a univocal logic, thought no longer holds priority over being
as we have to ask how it is possible that being is thought, both
in scholarship and in the roles and positions that bodies get
assigned to in the political–cultural sphere. Colebrook proposes
starting from a different question:
[…] from a finite point of consciousness within the world,
we see ourselves as subjected to relations (Deleuze, 1992);
but if one thinks further, if one strives to think from thepoint of view of the emergence of relations, one will no
longer enslave oneself to constituted terms, such as the
gender system, the heterosexual matrix or the framing
fantasy. One will ask what life must be such that fantasy
is possible: what must the body be such that its relations to
other bodies take the form of a sexual narrative? (Colebrook,
2004: 286; emphasis added).
Here we find an instance of the (philosophical) stance
that Barad labels as knowing in being or onto-epistemology.
It is useful to recall the concept of interference here, intro-
duced by Donna Haraway “to diffract the rays of technoscience
so that we get more promising interference patterns on the
recording films of our lives and bodies” (Haraway, 1997: 16).
It is only through the diffractive lens of interference thatwe can
understand how (power) relations really emerge.
The problem haunting many intersectional theories –
one which has been addressed in several poststructuralist
critiques of representationalism – is that although they consider
power structures, they lack a profound analysis of power and
its affected subjects. Easy assumptions about the workings of
power have guided their epistemologies and affirmed power as
a purely restrictive force, leading to the under-theorization of
the ambiguity of intersectional subjects' agency (see also Jaunait
& Chauvin, 2012). Instead of merely focusing on the different
matrices of domination as Collins does, educational psychologist
Dorthe Staunæs (2003), for instance, tries to both unravel how
power structures have co-constructed subjects through catego-
rization and to leave room for the analysis of the counteractions
of marginalized subjects. Whereas Collins more or less concep-
tualized the process of social categorization as an all-imposing
process, Staunæs – inspired by the Foucauldian idea that
where there is power, there must be resistance – preserves
the ambiguous agency of these subjects. Collins, like Crenshaw,
refers to the issues of power and agency (see Collins, 1990/
2009: 292–305 and Crenshaw, 1991: 1297), but both theorists
still cling to power as a primarily structural and disciplinary
phenomenon.3 In addition, their focus on severely marginalized
subjects leads to an epistemological problem: the experiences of
oppressed subjects who are also partially privileged disappear,
which turns intersectional theory into a rather defeatist theory
of victimization as we will show next.
The work of political philosopher Wendy Brown is relevant
if we want to tackle these epistemological blind spots in an
onto-epistemologicalmanner— aswehave to in order to arrive
at our evaluation. In an essay reflecting on the academic
institutionalization of women's studies, Brown observes
that the multi-sidedness of power (as in the diversified
power of feminist postmodernism) has been obscured in
most intersectional theories (Brown, 1997: 87). Following
in Foucault's and Butler's footsteps, Brown wishes to reflect
on the productive, and not merely the oppressive, role that
power has in the constitution of subjects (Brown, 1997: 86).
Ontologizing Staunæs' epistemological findings, Brown's cri-
tique works on a deeper level: she criticizes the representation-
alist assumptions of intersectional theories by pointing out that
intersectional subjects are marked and constituted by “different
mechanisms and sites of power, different discursive formations,
[and] different regulatory schemes” (Brown, 1997: 86) and
that “these powers of subject formation are not separable in
the subject itself” (Brown, 1997: 86). The intersectional subject,
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of various entanglements of different social categories, all
produced by different, particular sites of power, while any
analysis of such a subject should be executed holistically.
Brown not only criticizes additive intersectional models; she
claims that intersectional analyses in general tend to be
self-defeating since they cannot but analyze the intersectional
subject in a split manner, falling back into the same bifurcated
models they wish to criticize. Coming close to our conceptu-
alization of interference, queer theorist Jasbir Puar pushes her
critique of intersectionality even further by claiming that the
subject is not merely constituted by various power sites, but is
also an embodied, material subject, forever in transformation
and becoming. Puar takes her inspiration from Gilles Deleuze
and is not interested in how subjects are represented, because
the privileging of “naming, visuality, epistemology, represen-
tation, and meaning […]” (Puar, 2007: 215) in these theories
does not correspond to what a subject really is, namely an
assemblage of “dispersed but mutually implicated and messy
networks” (Puar, 2007: 211) of social categories.4
This discussion of the epistemological and thus ontological
blind spots of intersectional theory allowsus to take advantage of
Verloo's attempt to undo this (postmodernized) standpoint
theory or identity politics by thinking through intersecting axes
via a pattern of interference. In Verloo's inaugural lecture,
interference is only used metaphorically, which means that
her work stays within the representationalist realm; her
suggestion is epistemological, not onto-epistemological. Work-
ing along the lines of feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti, for
whom feminismought to be “a labour of creation,” (Braidotti and
Guild, 1991/1996: 164), we wish to follow up on Puar's recent
work by elaborating on Barad's take on interference. Criticism,
after all, only stays within the confines of representationalism.
Embracing ontology for intersectionality: interference
Barad has embraced interference and contributed to the
development of an intersectional theory that is not based
on an ontology-excluding representationalist epistemology.
Towards this end, she has – reminding us of Appiah – delved
deeply into the geometrical patterns that govern inter-
sectional theory's epistemological assumptions. Rewriting
intersectionality according towhat she calls an agential realism,
she affirms:
an agential realist notion of dynamics […] is not marked by
an exterior parameter called time, nor does it take place in a
container called space, but rather iterative intra-actions are
the dynamics through which temporality and spatiality are
produced and reconfigured in the (re)making of material–
discursive boundaries and their constitutive exclusions.
Exclusions introduce indeterminacies and open up a space
of agency; they are the conditions of possibility of new
possibilities (Barad & DeKoven, 2001: 90).
Barad reworks the axiological parameters of intersectional
thinking by rethinking time and space along the lines of the
emergence of relations. Whereas intersectionality was devel-
oped “as a mutually perpendicular set of axes of identification
within which marked bodies can be positioned” (Barad &
DeKoven, 2001: 98), Barad tries to release the possibility ofentanglement — a term we already encountered when
discussing Brown and Puar. Intersectional theory studies how
a person (or a group) is positioned, i.e., marked by multiple
categories that are different from the person (or group). As the
person (or identity group) can be known through these linguistic
categories alone, intersectionality only works with categories
that have representational power along predetermined axes of
hierarchical power relations (Barad & DeKoven, 2001: 98).
Evoking Verloo, Foucault and Colebrook, and explicitly following
up on Haraway, Barad wants to think about (power) relations
differently, working with “[s]tructures [that] are constraining
and enabling, not determining” (Barad & DeKoven, 2001: 99).
Barad, then, sees how the ontological turn takes us out of the
essentialism–constructivism opposition: “The space of possi-
bilities does not represent a fixed event horizon within which
the social location of knowers can be mapped, nor a
homogenous fixed uniform container of choices” (Barad &
DeKoven, 2001: 103). By allowing for relations to be made and
made differently, we no longer assume that a social category or a
set of social categories has a decisive and uniform effect
(essentialism); nor do we continue to believe in the Butlerian
queering of the norm (radical social constructivism). Barad
affirms that “structures are themselves material–discursive
phenomena which are produced through the intra-action
of specific apparatuses of bodily production marked by
exclusions” (Barad & DeKoven, 2001: 95; emphasis in original)
— that is, non-exhaustive zones of the production of bodies and
meanings. Social categories do not pre-exist as determining
structures that map subjects (or rather objects) along single
or multiple axes. What we tend to call categories or axes do
not work as such. Structures are exclusionary (i.e., they are
constraining) and enabling (i.e., they allow for surprises). They
are nothing but phenomenal interference patterns that are
always on the move.
Conceptualizing structures as interference patterns has far-
reaching effects. Barad reminds her readers of Leela Fernandes,
whose class, gender and community analysis of a Calcutta
jute mill suggests a dynamics that “is perhaps more akin to
a differential gear assemblage in which the gear operations
literally work through one another and yet the uneven
distribution of forces results in and is the enabling condition
for different potentials and performances among the gears”
(Barad & DeKoven, 2001: 79). The idea that patterns are
constantly evolving, and that different patterns intra-act instead
of merely interacting with one another (also see Lykke, 2011:
208-209), generating an assemblage that is holistic – i.e., not
separable – is one of Barad's onto-epistemological key points.
Whereas the concept of interaction stands for a traditional
atomist ontology in which subjects (or categories and axes, in
epistemology) are seen as agents that exist prior to their actions,
this model accentuates that “distinct agencies do not precede,
but rather emerge through, their intra-action” (Barad et al.,
2007: 33). It is this aspect of intra-action that, together with the
interference pattern as such, guides us towards envisioning
intersectionality differently.
Two innovative applications of intersectional theory
in gender research seem to anticipate Barad's full-blown
intersectionality-as-interference. The first is political the-
orist Rita Dhamoon's “Considerations on Mainstreaming
Intersectionality” (Dhamoon, 2011), in which she focuses
on her own revised intersectional model: the “matrix of
177E. Geerts, I. van der Tuin / Women's Studies International Forum 41 (2013) 171–178meaning-making” (Dhamoon, 2011: 238). Although the
model has its roots in both Foucauldian poststructuralist
thought and Collins' matrix of domination, Dhamoon
reconceptualizes this matrix model in such a way that
it could – with some re-adjustments – integrate Barad's
onto-epistemology. Dhamoon's matrix namely “serves as a
depiction of the movement and refractions among inter-
actions, the relationships among processes and sets of
interactions, differing levels or depths of political life, and
the large picture in which differences are connected”
(Dhamoon, 2011: 238–239). Such a revised intersectional
model “reflects the shifting fusions of multilayered and
relational differences” (Dhamoon, 2011: 238) and hence
seems to address the productive, multi-directional intra-
action between all these differences.
But seen through a Baradian lens, it soon becomes clear
that Dhamoon's matrix is still stuck in a representationalist
logic according to which the aforementioned productive
effects can easily be predicted: these effects are never really
surprises. Dhamoon's matrix partially breaks through this
representationalism of prioritizing thought over being by
foregrounding a relational ontology in which processes of
subject formation are seen as co-evolving with the subjects
they constitute. Yet, although Dhamoon's matrix of
meaning-making foregrounds “the shifting, messy, indeter-
minate, dynamic, and multi-layered movements of differ-
ence making” (Dhamoon, 2011: 239), it cannot be pushed to
complete indeterminacy — which is central to Baradian
interference.
Science studies scholar Ingunn Moser's essay “Sociotechnical
Practices and Difference” (Moser, 2006) also comes close to
Baradian interference — albeit for different reasons. In Moser's
ethnographic essay on disabled people's life-stories, she explic-
itly uses the concept of interference – by referring to Haraway,
who Barad also credits – to see how social differences are
always in the making through patterns of interference. Moser
pays attention to how the interference patterns of gender, ‘race’/
ethnicity, disability, and class can work with or against one
another, and hence either intensify or decrease oppression or
privilege. Significantly, the article beginswith a startling example
of Moser, an able-bodied woman, being interpolated by one
of her disabled interviewees: “In the twinkling of an eye, with a
joking statement, Roger was positioned as the boss, themanager
or master of the house passing orders to his subordinates,
caregivers, or personal assistants” (Moser, 2006: 544). Moser's
point is that the alleged binary opposition between disabled
and able-bodied, and the possible subversion of the norm
of able-bodiedness in a study that gives a disabled subject
agency, canwork out differently owing to intersecting categories
interfering with one another. Moser does not give Roger agency,
as it is Roger (the interviewee) who had already positioned
Moser (the interviewer) in a stereotypically feminine role. This
may not even be a conscious act on Roger's part as it happens ‘[i]
n the twinkling of an eye, with a joking statement.’ Treating this
experience as more insightful than the actual interview – thus
moving away from the self-conscious subject position of the
ethnographer and doing justice to knowing-in-being – Moser
foregrounds the indeterminacy and unpredictability that arise in
such a relational ontology of interference patterns. Openness,
maybe even chaos, is the result: when one for instance tries to
undo certain power relations related to gender, one at the sametime runs the risk of enlarging these differences or even creating
other difference patterns (see Moser, 2006: 557).
Conclusion: on fire with interference
The instances of interference our argument built on
range from Verloo's hands-on political science model to
map the effects of EU policies beyond the perpetual evocation
of what Nash has called quintessential intersectional subjects
to Barad's plea for an onto-epistemological understanding
of the emergence of both hierarchical power relations
and relations that are subversive because they cannot be
understood along the lines of a restrictive power hierarchy.
In-between these extremes we have positioned scholars
who seem to approach interference either epistemologically
(Dhamoon) or by stumbling upon relationalities that almost
suggest pure potentia (Moser). We see this spectrum as
fertile ground for undoing some of the intersectional theory's
most prominent shortcomings – problems that derive from
its buying into representationalism. A more fully worked out
‘interference theory’ would hence allow gender researchers
from many disciplines to produce precise case studies that
demonstrate how power (being potestas and potentia) is
intrinsically out of phase with itself, and how, therefore, the
production of the most surprising interference patterns is
inherent to its working. In light of the genealogy of inter-
sectionality, sensitivity for such indeterminacy is what we
need to free ourselves from the defeatism as well as the
defeat of intersectionality. It is not that intersectional theory
has to be set alight; we nevertheless hope that this article has
inflamed passions for furthering theory on interference.
Endnotes
1 See Butler, 2006/1990: 2–3, and Foucault, 1976/1990: 135–159 for the
productive side of power.
2 Appiah made this point in a section titled ‘Concluding Unscientific
Postscript’. We read this as a reference to Søren Kierkegaard's eponymous
work that not only looks back at his entire oeuvre – like Appiah looks back at
Du Bois' oeuvre – but also, and significantly, criticizes Hegel's Master–Slave's
dialectics (Kierkegaard, 1846/1941). What we encounter is a critique of
conceptualizations of the Self/Other structure that are unable to shift
existing power relations.
3 Note that Crenshaw's conceptualization of power, more than Collins',
is already moving in a Foucauldian/Butlerian direction since she thinks it is
possible for marginalized subjects to take on their social categorization in a
positive, subversive manner. See Crenshaw, 1991: 1297. Yet, Crenshaw still
holds onto a group politics model which prevents her from going as far as
Foucault and Butler.
4 See also Puar (2012).
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